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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

support a finding of reasonable diligence, the supreme court deferred
to the findings of the water court. To demonstrate reasonable
diligence, Colorado statutory law and case law requires that the
applicant show steady efforts to complete the appropriation in an
expedient and efficient manner under all the facts and circumstances,
and continuous, project-specific efforts directed toward the
development of the conditional right commensurate with the
applicant's capabilities. The court did not disturb the water court's
findings, citing evidence in the record of Getty's investment in stream
gauges, funding of geological investigations, and involvement in
litigation to protect its water rights.
On the Subdistrict's final contention that the water court erred in
its interpretation and application of section 37-92-301(4) (c) to the
facts, the supreme court relied on their decision in Municipal
Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. OXY. The
court recognized in OXY that both the "economic feasibility"
requirement and the "can and will" requirement must be considered
together in a diligence analysis, yet economic feasibility is only one
factor that a court should consider in a diligence proceeding. The
court deferred to the water court's finding that the oil shale project
was technically feasible given current technology, thus demonstrating
that Getty "can" complete and "will" go forward with the project.
Sommer Poole
Haystack Ranch, L.L.C. v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548 (Colo. 2000)
(affirming the water court's decree of abandonment where the
evidence consisted mainly of the ditches' state of disrepair and lack of
diversion records despite removal of the ditches from the division
engineer's abandonment list).
In 1993, Haystack Ranch, L.L.C. ("Haystack") purchased property
that contained two ditches, the Snyder and Middleton Ditches, with
appropriation dates of 1879 and 1888, respectively. The property
changed hands several times before Haystack acquired it and the chain
of title showed that only the Snyder Ditch was expressly conveyed with
Haystack drew water under its rights from
each transaction.
unauthorized alternate points of diversion, causing curtailment to
Frank Fazzio's ("Fazzio") junior right. As a result, Fazzio filed an
application of abandonment for the water rights of the Snyder and
Middleton Ditches (the "Ditches") and a tort action for damage to his
hay crops.
The Division One Water Court held that the water rights in
question had been abandoned before Haystack acquired them. The
water court considered the Ditches' state of disrepair, the lack of
diversion records, and the long periods of unexcused nonuse. Such
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nonuse, the water court held, created a rebuttable presumption of the
previous owner's intent to abandon the water rights, and Haystack
failed to rebut this presumption. Haystack appealed the decision of
the water court.
Haystack first argued it was error for the water court to rely on the
nonexistence of diversion records as evidence of nonuse. The
Colorado Supreme Court found, however, that the water court had
only partially relied on the lack of diversion records and that this
reliance was permissible where other testimonial and documentary
evidence bolstered the court's finding of nonuse. The additional
evidence involved testimony from the former water commissioner that
was consistent with reports from two water engineering firms noting
the long disuse and state of disrepair of the Ditches. Because water
rights are usufructuary in nature, nonuse retired the use entitlement
to the stream. Nonuse can be manifested by conditions inconsistent
with active use of a water right, including the failure to make beneficial
use of the water and the failure to repair or maintain diversion
structures. Thus, the supreme court held that the entirety of the
evidence supported the water court's finding of nonuse.
This finding of nonuse was crucial because one can infer
abandonment from nonuse coupled with an intent to abandon.
Continued and unexplained nonuse of a water right for an
unreasonable period of time creates a rebuttable presumption of
intent to abandon. Because the water court found nonuse, Haystack
next argued that the activities of the past and current owners rebutted
the presumption of intent to abandon the water rights for the Ditches.
Haystack pointed to the chain of title that expressly conveyed Snyder
Ditch, its diversions of water, and its attempts to get alternate points of
diversion authorized by the state. The supreme court first held that
chain of title is never enough alone to rebut the presumption of intent
to abandon. The Court next held that, while Haystack's use of the
water constituted evidence of lack of intent to abandon, this use came
too late. The water court found nonuse before Haystack acquired the
water rights, and subsequent actions could not rebut a presumption of
the previous owners' intent to abandon.
Third, Haystack argued the removal of the water rights from the
division engineer's abandonment list in 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1984
strongly indicated a lack of intent to abandon these rights. While
acknowledging that administrative officials' decisions warranted
considerable deference, the supreme court concluded the division
engineer's decision was not alone sufficient to make a finding of lack
of intent to abandon.
The court looked to the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (the "Act") and found
the Act's general scheme supported the conclusion that a division
engineer's decision is merely evidence that a water court may consider.
Because a division engineer's decision is not a definitive decree or
judgment under the Act, the water court could simply add this
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evidence to the larger calculus in determining its final outcome.
The supreme court affirmed the water court's judgment that the
evidence supporting abandonment substantially outweighed the
engineer's decision to remove the rights from the abandonment list.
Susan P. Klopman
Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993
P.2d 1177 (Colo. 2000) (holding the Management District, not the
Commission, had authority to issue or refuse to issue well withdrawal
curtailment orders within Management District boundaries).
David Goss ("Goss") owned a well (the "Goss Well") in the Upper
Black Squirrel Creek Designated Ground Water Basin ("Designated
Basin"). His permit allowed him to irrigate forty acres with an annual
appropriation of 200 acre-feet. The Goss Well had a number two
Water
Commission's
Colorado
Ground
priority
on
the
("Commission") priority list for the Designated Basin.
On July 28, 1997, Goss filed a written request with the Commission
for issuance of a summary order requiring the cessation of pumping
from wells that were interfering with Goss' senior water rights. On
September 2, 1997, Goss filed a written request with the Management
District to enjoin the Cherokee Metropolitan District's junior
Cherokee Well and other unnamed wells that were negatively
impacting his senior rights. The Commission, through the Attorney
General, responded on September 15, 1997, that Goss should direct
his request to the Management District as it, not the Commission, had
authority over his request. On December 2, 1997, the Management
District voted to deny Goss' request on the basis that it did not have
authority over it. Consequentially, Goss filed a Complaint with the El
Paso County District Court seeking (1) a writ of mandamus compelling
either the Management District or the Commission to order the
cessation of withdrawals from wells which may be injuring his senior
rights; (2) an injunction and damages against the Cherokee
Metropolitan District; and (3) a declaratory judgment for
determination of rights and obligations regarding enforcement of his
priority.
The Ground Water Judge held that a writ of mandamus did not lie
against the Management District because the statute allows discretion
in its administration of wells, rather than establishing a nondiscretionary duty. Additionally, the Ground WaterJudge held that an
administrative remedy for alleged injury to a permitted well right
resides in the Management District and must first be exhausted before
pursuing recourse in court. The Ground Water Judge issued a
declaratory judgment, dictating that the Management District had
authority over Goss' request to enforce the priority of his well. The

